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Abstract 
Real life examples of large system level failures in complex networked system are fairly common, with national 
and regional level power grids providing numerous cases where local failures have resulted in broad systemic 
failures. As large networked systems-of-systems are increasingly common, their susceptibility to large scale failures 
is of significant interest. This paper presents the results of a study using a simple model to investigate the impacts of 
basic architecture characteristics on the spread of failures through a system-of-system after an initial failure occurs. 
The study reported here uses a non-symmetric inter-grid only failure model to investigate the sensitivity of failure 
progression due to failure in dependent nodes in a system-of-system composed of dependent grid networks to the 
several basic parameters, including initial failure size, grid node density and grid interdependency radius. 
Despite the use of only an inter-grid failure mechanism, the study results generally showed a rapid failure 
propagation to a steady state condition. A possible mechanism for this return to steady state in terms of the 
expanding failure front and probability that existing dependent nodes lie outside of the failure front is discussed. 
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1. Introduction
The susceptibility of networked systems-of-systems to large scale, systemic failure modes is of interest and 
relevance to system design and analysis approaches for many modern systems. The system-of-system architectural 
characteristics that contribute to or limit cascading type failure modes where limited initial failures result in a much 
larger system failures should be a key considerations in large system-of-system design.
This paper presents the results of a study using a simple model to investigate the impacts of basic architecture 
characteristics on the spread of failures through a system-of-system after an initial failure occurs. The study 
described in this paper is unique in that it includes only inter-network failure mechanisms, uses a non-symmetric 
dependency model and develops a parametric investigation the sensitivity of failure progression in a system-of-
system composed of inter-dependent grid networks to several basic parameters, including initial failure size, grid 
node density and grid interdependency radius. 
The paper is organized as follows:  Section 2 describes some examples the issue of cascading encountered in 
complex networked systems-of-systems (national level power grids) over the last several decades. Section 3 surveys 
research using network modelling approaches to analysing and understanding these large system level failures. 
Section 4 describes the dual network model developed for this study. Section 5 summarizes the results of a 
parametric study of the impact of major variables on internetwork dependency failure cascades performed using this 
model. Section 6 provides a brief discussion of conclusions. 
2. Examples of Failures in Complex Networked Systems
Some of the most notable large scale system-of-systems failures of the cascading type have taken place in large 
scale power grids. This section describes a number of these failures to illustrate the failure initiation, progression, 
timing and extent possible with these types of failure cascades. 
On November 9th and 10th 1965 a major power supply line, from a hydroelectric plant, operating at high levels 
but below capacity had a back-up circuit interrupt trip. The resulting loss of power in the system lowered 
frequencies and set off a cascade of generator trips that blacked out much of the North East US for one to two days. 
The failure cascade took approximately ten minutes to spread from the Canadian point of origin to the New York 
City area1. On July 13, 1977 a localized blackout hit New York City and left 9 million people without power for up 
to a day.  This blackout was started by multiple (four) lightning strikes in quick succession (less than one hour) on 
Consolidated Edison transmission towers2. On July 2nd 1996 a main line in Idaho was lost due to a flashover 
(current bridging) to a tree that was too close to a power line. 2 million people over a large part of the north and mid-
west lost power for up to several hours. Another large North American failure case was the August 14, 2003 failure 
that collapsed the North Eastern regional system in 9 seconds and removed power to about 50 million people in the 
northeast for almost half a day3. 
An example of a non-North American blackout was the 28 September 2003 Blackout in Italy. This failure started 
with a line failure in a major power line in Switzerland. Within 2 ½ minutes the failure cascade had knocked out 
power to approximately 60 million people in Italy. In this case the system was in stable operation with sufficient 
margin before the initiating event, but due to lack of immediate action and coordination between the Swiss and 
Italian controllers the failure cascade proceeded4, 5, 6. 
3. Modeling Failure Cascades in Networked Complex Systems-of-Systems
A promising means to model and understand the nature of these large cascading failures has been the application 
of network theory with the systems represented by vertices or nodes and edges or links with varying characteristics 
and distributions. For complex networked technical systems, graph theory approaches have been applied that have 
highlighted the many dimensions of structural complexity these systems can exhibit, with a prime example being the 
nature of node connectivity, ranging from regular grid networks, to completely random networks7,8. 
The small world class of networks having many nodes with few links and a few nodes with high numbers of links 
have emerged as representative of many real world networked systems, including power grids and the internet. 
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Failure analysis of small world networks has shown these topologies to be robust when random failures occur but 
potentially highly impacted when high connectivity nodes are failed7, 8.   
A study using a highly detailed network based model (tens of thousands of nodes and links) of the US power grid 
have shown connectivity distributions similar to small world or scale free networks. This study included details such 
as load shifting from failed nodes and links and the shutdown of generators when power can no longer be 
transmitted. The load shifting aspect in particular contributed to cascading type failures. This study also highlighted 
the important role of nodes over which many paths transit (the betweeness of a node) and the redundancy of paths 
with the potential for failures of internal nodes to isolate portions of the network9. 
Illuminating studies have also been conducted on fairly simple network models to develop theories and insights 
into the basic mechanisms of failure cascades. A simple but very illustrative study modeled networks as interacting 
agents with an agent’s state dependent on the states of neighbouring agents. This model developed failure cascades 
when highly connected agents were involved in the failures10.   Another study expanded the model fidelity from the 
basic binary failed/active model with degraded node and edge states. In this study congested nodes and reduced 
efficiency edges resulted when load margins were above design load levels11.   
A further refinement included overload failures and an intentional focus on highly loaded nodes to model attacks 
on networked systems. This reference emphasized the non-random nature of real world networks due to 
geographical and other physical factors and the non-random nature of node failures in the case of a targeted attack 
and the potential for highly destructive cascade based attacks due to the these characteristics12. 
Several studies developed the impact of network loading near critical points, i.e. where significant portions of the 
network are be operated near capacity, on the probability of failures developing into failure cascades. These studies 
develop an argument that due to economic, technical and societal drivers, many large networked systems evolve or 
self-organize to operate routinely at near critical loadings13, 14. 
A significant recent expansion of the network based analysis of complex systems-of-systems has been to model 
multiple interacting or dependent networks. Real world examples of interacting networks include power grids 
dependent on communications networks for control and monitoring and communications networks dependent on the 
power grids for power. These studies have shown increased propensity for failure cascades due to network 
interactions and the potential for initial failures above certain sizes to completely collapse some interdependent 
networks, especially spatially embedded or geographically constrained topologies. These studies model both the 
failures due to dependencies in the other networks as well as losses due to loss of connectivity of nodes and regions 
in the network of interest15, 16, 17, 18. 
The following section follows this approach of analysing a system-of-system as interconnected and 
interdependent networks. It develops a simple model using interdependent grid or regular networks and focuses on 
the failure progression following on from only the dependencies on failed nodes in the other networks. 
4. A Simple Model of Complex Networked Systems-of-Systems for Investigating Parametric Sensitivity
The system-of-system was modeled using two interacting grid networks as shown in equation 1. 
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The node failure modelling generally followed the inter-network failure modelling of the studies on spatially 
embedded network15, 16, 17, 18. For this study, however, there were no within-network dependencies and asymmetric 
dependencies were used. 
The nodes making up the grid networks in this study had a basic two state model as shown in equation 2.
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The nodes dependency on nodes in the other grid was a simple fail if dependent on node that fails model as 
shown in equation 3.
Nodes in network (i) were depedent on nodes in network(j) and nodes in network (j) were dependent on nodes in 
network (i) but these depedencies were not symetric, i.e. node (i) mn depednecy on node (j) pq did not imply the 
converse of node (j) pq dependency on node (i) mn, rather the node depedencies for each network were chosen 
randomly within the constraints of the network dependency and active population parameters. 
The network dependency and active population parameters to be studied were as defined in equation 4
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The initial network damage region (within which all nodes in network (i) were set to inactive) was as defined as 
in equation 5, where the damage radius was one of the parameters under study and the center point was randomly 
chosen for each run.     
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This system-of-system was modeled in Matlab using two 2500 node grid networks with 2500 nodes. A typical 
initial set of failed nodes is shown in Figure 1 and in detail in Figure 2. 
Figure 1 Grid Network Geometry Figure 2 Initial Failure Region
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 An individual failure iteration started with an initial set of failed nodes which resulted in follow-on failures in 
nodes in the dependent grid. These in turn resulted in failures in their dependent nodes in the original network. The 
dependent nodes failure propagation between the interdependent grid networks was allowed to continue over 
sufficient iterations to achieve a steady state condition where no more failures occurred.  As shown in figure 3 this 
typically occurred by 20 to 30 iterations, so 50 failure iterations were used for the study.  Figure 4 shows a 
representative progression of failures across multiple failure iterations. 
The primary parameters investigated were the initial failure size, node dependency radius (how close the node in 
the other grid is upon which a given node is dependent) and active node fraction (how many nodes in a grid are 
active). For a given combination of parameters, the differences in the final failure extent (the key measure of impact) 
varied by about +/- 25% about the average value for runs with different initial failure start points and different node 
dependencies (due to the random selection of these within the specified bounds for a given run). This spread is 
shown in Figure 5. 
Figure 3 Convergence to Stable Failure State for a Range of 
Initial Failure Sizes
Figure 4 Example of Typical Progression of Failures
Figure 5 Final Failure Fraction Spreads for a Range 
of Initial Failure Sizes 
Figure 6 Grid Failure Iteration for a Given Parameter Set
and Initial Failure Size
350   Charles O. Adler and Cihan H. Dagli /  Procedia Computer Science  36 ( 2014 )  345 – 352 
The study progressed by running 50 distinct network iterations for each parameter and initial failure size point. 
Each network run had a randomly selected initial failure center point and randomly chosen node dependencies. 50 
failure iterations were run for each network run. The network iteration loop flow is shown in Figure 6. The average 
number of nodes failed for the initial network over the 50 network iterations for each failure iteration step was used 
to characterize the failure progression for the study. 
5. Results of a Basic Sensitivity Study
The primary results of the study are summarized in Figure 7 (effect of grid dependency radius) and Figure 8
(effect of active node fraction) for a range of initial failure sizes. These figures are a compact illustration of the 
failure extent progression.   
For a given grid dependency radius or active node fraction and an initial failure extent the small bar chart set 
labeled 1 in the figures represents the average failure development for 50 network iterations over 50 failure 
iterations. The steepness of the progression of the bars from left to right represents the rate at which this case 
converged to a stable or static failure case. The height of the bars indicates the extent of the failed nodes. 
The grouping of 5 increasing height (i.e. greater number of failed nodes) sets labeled ‘2’ in the figures represents 
a given dependency radius or a given active node fraction with 5 different initial failure radius’, with the failure 
progression growing larger from left to right. 
The overall set of 6 dependency radius or active node sets from left to right shows the impact of these parameters 
for the range of initial failure cases studies (initial failure radius from 0.02 to 0.32 of the grid span) and the range of 
these parameters studied. 
Figure 7 Progression of Grid-One Node Failures with Grid Dependency Radius and Initial Failure Size
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The grid dependency study in Figure 7 showed a fairly steady increase in final failure extent with increasing grid 
dependency radius – indicating that limiting node relationships to nearby nodes may limit the failure progression. 
This case also showed that more failure iterations were required to reach the final failure extent for the larger grid 
dependency values, and that the failure progression curves for given scenario were fairly steep indicating that the 
failure progression progressed both more rapidly and for a longer time than the lower dependency radius values.  
The active node fraction study in Figure 8 showed a fairly non-linear dependency on the density of dependent 
nodes in the grid networks with a transition point in density occurring above which failure progressions are more 
rapid and result in significantly larger final failure extents. 
6. Conclusions
Despite the use of only an inter-grid failure mechanism, the study results generally showed a rapid failure
propagation to a steady state condition. The final size of the failure extent was highly dependent on the initial failure 
extent and the span or radius of dependency for the nodes between the grid networks. 
The study showed a fairly non-linear dependency on the density of active nodes in the grid networks with a 
transition point in dependency density occurring above which failure progressions are more rapid and result in 
significantly larger final failure extents.  
Figure 8 Progression of Grid-One Node Failures with Fraction of Active Nodes and Initial Failure Size
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The primary mechanism for the slowing and stopping of failure cascades and the eventual return to a steady state 
condition is hypothesized to be due to the progressive reduction in the relative number of dependent nodes still 
unfailed as the failed region grows in radius and the failure front is spread out over this larger radius – i.e. the failed 
nodes at the edge of the expanding failure region are progressively farther apart and eventually the progression of 
the failures at a given point on the failure front ceases when all of the dependent nodes are within the already failed 
region. As this occurs across the entire failure front, the cascade slows and eventually reaches a steady state. 
This simple analysis demonstrated some interesting characteristics that may provide indications how basic 
system-of-system architecture characteristics can contribute to system resilience – for example, these results suggest 
that limiting system interdependencies to local nodes in other networks may improve robustness against cascading 
failures. 
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